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Abstract
This paper analyzes the long-run dynamics of internal conflict, elite action over privately-
versus publicly-provided security, and state development outcomes in China. We con-
struct new county-level data that span nearly one millennium. We find that, traditionally,
elites turned away from clans and toward the imperial government for safety in times of
internal conflict. After the new globalizing Western influence took hold in the mid-1800s,
however, threatening the imperial government’s viability, we find that elites turned back
toward clans for protection, particularly during the Taiping Rebellion. Finally, we find
a positive link between renewed clan activity and the eventual failure of the imperial
Qing state. Our analysis provides a new perspective on the political origins of the Great
Divergence, by which Europe took off economically, but China fell behind.
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1 Introduction
By the start of the twentieth century, modern nation-states were prevalent across Western
Europe (Dincecco 2017, 37-58). In contrast, the imperial Qing state in China, which had
ruled for nearly 300 years, failed (Rosenthal and Wong 2011, 222). While the literature on
the economic divergence between these two world regions has a long pedigree (e.g., Pomeranz
2000), the literature on their political divergence is relatively recent (e.g., Stasavage 2016). Fur-
thermore, much of the extant literature on long-run political development centers on Europe
(e.g., Tilly 1975; Stasavage 2011; Cox 2016).
To improve our understanding of the rise and decline of China’s imperial state, this pa-
per systematically analyzes the dynamics of internal conflict, elite action over privately-
versus publicly-provided security, and state development outcomes in China over the long
run. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first such study of this kind. We argue that
internal conflict may promote state formation or state failure, depending on the basic vi-
ability of the central government, which we characterize in terms of its ability in the eyes
of elites to provide military defense against external attack threats. In the context in which
the central government is minimally viable, then elites will likely prefer to turn away from
the private provision of security and toward the central government for safety in times of
internal conflict as their default choice. Alternatively, in the context in which the central
government is no longer minimally viable in the eyes of elites, however, then they may pre-
fer to turn away from the central government and back toward privately-provided security.
If enough elites turn away from the central government, moreover, then renewed emphasis
on privately-provided security can eventually promote state failure.
Our analysis makes use of new county-level panel data for China that span nearly 1,000
years, from 1000 to 1911. This database brings together information on internal conflict and
clan activity for more than 2,300 counties. To measure the local extent of internal conflict, we
geocode the locations of all recorded mass rebellion battles over this time period. These data
include nearly 1,200 such battles. We conceptualize local elite action in terms of clans, the
traditional form of social organization in China (Weber 1951 [1915], 86-8; Greif and Tabellini
2017, 4). To proxy for clan activity, we record the number of genealogy books written down
in each county across time. This approach is not only feasible, given historical data limita-
tions, but is also systematic.
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Our conceptual framework suggests that, in the pre-1850 context in which Western in-
fluence was virtually null and the basic viability of the imperial government was generally
intact (Rosenthal and Wong 2011, 221), then internal conflict would likely prompt elites to
turn away from privately-provided security through traditional clans and toward publicly-
provided security through the imperial government. We provide two types of evidence
consistent with this prediction.
First, we perform a panel regression analysis of mass rebellion and clan activity from
1000 to 1849. To help control for unobservable features that may bias our results, our anal-
ysis includes county and period fixed effects and province-specific time trends. We find a
negative and highly significant relationship between mass rebellion and clan activity, which
suggests that elites turned away from traditional clans in times of internal conflict. To ad-
dress the possibility of reverse causation, we perform placebo tests, which provide further
evidence that the main direction of causation ran from mass rebellion to clan activity, and
not vice versa.
Second, we provide evidence that internal conflict increased elite demand for publicly-
provided security. We geocode the location of each new military garrison established dur-
ing the first century of Ming rule (1368-1467), the heyday of imperial garrison construction.
We find a positive and highly significant relationship between mass rebellion and new gar-
risons, even after controlling for prefectural fixed effects and county-level demographic, eco-
nomic, and geographical features. This result is consistent with our framework’s prediction
that elites turned toward the imperial government for safety in times of internal conflict.
After 1850, the geopolitical context in China changed due to the new globalizing Western
influence, and the imperial government’s basic viability began to suffer in the eyes of elites
due to this “critical juncture” (Skocpol 1979, 73; Rosenthal and Wong 2011, 221). Accord-
ing to our conceptual framework, internal conflict in this new context would likely prompt
elites to turn away from the imperial government and publicly-provided security in favor
of traditional clans and their private militias. We put forth three types of evidence in this
regard.
First, we extend the panel regression analysis described above to include the 1850-1900
period. Now, the relationship of mass rebellion and clan activity turns positive (it remains
highly significant). This result suggests that, if elites no longer viewed the imperial govern-
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ment as minimally viable, then they would turn back toward the privately-provided security
of traditional clans for safety in times of internal conflict.
Second, we perform an in-depth analysis of elite action in response to the mid-nineteenth
century Taiping Rebellion, an internal conflict of unprecedented historical magnitude. Com-
paring clan activity before and after the Taiping Rebellion, we show that counties that expe-
rienced more rebellion battles saw a highly significant increase in post-Taiping clan activity.
The results of this analysis provide additional support for our argument that elites turned
toward traditional clans for protection if the imperial government was not minimally viable.
Third, we show evidence that the renewed emphasis on privately-provided security may
have eventually promoted state failure. Here, we analyze the extent to which local deci-
sions to declare independence from the imperial Qing government in 1911 were a func-
tion of greater clan activity during the post-Taiping period. We find a positive and highly
significant relationship between post-Taiping clan activity and independence declarations,
even after controlling for prefectural fixed effects, local observables, and other potential con-
founders including the Taiping Rebellion itself and the abolition of the imperial civil service
exam (Bai and Jia 2016).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the extant literature. Sec-
tion 3 develops our conceptual framework. Section 4 provides qualitative evidence in terms
of this framework. Section 5 describes the quantitative data construction. Section 6 presents
the empirical strategy, main results, and robustness checks for the pre-1850 context, and Sec-
tion 7 for the post-1850 context. Section 8 analyzes the relationship between post-1850 clan
activity and Qing state failure. Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper speaks to two key social science debates.
2.1 Great Divergence
The first such debate concerns the historical determinants of the “Great Divergence”, by
which Western Europe took off economically in the nineteenth century but China fell be-
hind (e.g., Pomeranz 2000; Allen 2009; Rosenthal and Wong 2011). As described in Section
1, the literature on the economic divergence between these two world regions has a long
4
pedigree, while that on their political divergence is relatively recent.1 Given that the state
may play an important role in economic development (e.g., North 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2005; Besley and Persson 2011; Dincecco 2017), however, this political diver-
gence deserves greater analysis. Stasavage (2016) asks why the emergence of parliamentary
government was unique to Western Europe. He argues that endemic political fragmentation
placed European rulers in weak bargaining positions vis-a`-vis elites, and that the small geo-
graphical scale of European states further reduced the “transaction costs” of representative
government. Cox (2017) emphasizes the interactive effects of political fragmentation and po-
litical innovations, including urban autonomy and national-level parliaments. Dincecco and
Wang (2018) explicitly link political geography (i.e., political fragmentation versus central-
ization) with Europe-China differences in violent conflict and political development, while
Ko, Koyama and Sng (2018) explain political geography differences between the two regions
in terms of multidirectional versus unidirectional attack threats. Blaydes and Paik (2016) fo-
cus on the role of the Crusades in European political development, while Voigtla¨nder and
Voth (2013) highlight the unique relationships between the Black Death, urbanization, and
warfare. Finally, Hoffman (2015) analyzes the political conditions that enabled Western Eu-
rope to develop superior military technology relative to China.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the political divergence between Western Eu-
rope and China on several fronts. Unlike most of the above works, we focus explicitly on
long-run patterns of elite decision-making within China itself, thereby bringing a new per-
spective to this debate. To perform this task, we draw on a novel historical database, along
with rigorous statistical methods. Furthermore, we develop a new conceptual framework,
which argues that whether violent conflict promotes state formation or state failure is con-
tingent upon the central government’s basic underlying viability in the eyes of elites.
As described in Section 1, the results of our analysis suggest that, during the period
in which Western Europe took off economically, the imperial government in China faced a
new globalizing Western influence, which inverted a long-standing trend in which elites had
turned away from traditional clans and toward the imperial government for safety in times
of internal conflict. Rather, in post-1850 China, elites turned toward traditional clans for
protection – right when much of Western Europe was industrializing. Our results suggest,
1Brandt, Ma and Rawski (2013) provides an overview of this large economics literature.
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moreover, that renewed clan activity in the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion was linked
with the eventual failure of the imperial Qing state. Neither renewed clan strength nor state
failure is likely to be conducive to modern economic development (e.g., Greif 2006, 310-11;
Besley and Persson 2011, 27-31). Thus, by highlighting the relationships between internal
conflict, local elite action, and state development outcomes, our analysis also provides a new
rationale for the economic divergence between Western Europe and China.
In this respect, our paper builds on the important work of Greif and Tabellini (2017), who
analyze historical East-West differences in social cooperation. They argue that, by the year
1000, “kin-oriented morality” was dominant in China, while “impersonal-oriented moral-
ity” was so in Western Europe. Given the kin orientation of morality, the natural way to
enforce cooperation in China was through the clan, in which clan elders played a key role
in dispute resolution. Over time, the importance of the clan as the main means of social co-
operation grew. In Europe, by contrast, the corporation – a voluntary organization between
unrelated individuals – was the natural way to enforce cooperation, given the impersonal
orientation of morality.
Unlike Greif and Tabellini, who focus on religion and morality to explain clan develop-
ment in China, we highlight the importance of internal conflict and security. Furthermore,
while Greif and Tabellini argue that the traditional clan expanded in importance as the locus
of cooperation in China, our analysis suggests that the clan’s role actually weakened over
time, at least in response to internal conflict before the mid-1800s. Additionally, we show
that the clan eventually re-gained strength, but only when the imperial government began
to lose its basic viability. Thus, our paper offers new insights into clan dynamics, and the
clan’s role vis-a`-vis the imperial government in providing social order, over the long run.
Our paper, moreover, offers a novel counterpart to Dincecco and Onorato (2017). They
argue that warfare was a historical driver of urban development in Western Europe, since
urban fortifications provided “safe harbors” from the highly destructive rural effects of con-
flict. The relative historical importance of the clan was far greater in China than in Western
Europe (Greif and Tabellini 2017, 4, 6-7). Thus, we may think that individuals in China had
two options to seek security in the face of violent conflict – the clan or the city (and the mili-
tary garrisons located therein). We will discuss these options at greater length in Subsection
4.2. In Europe, by contrast, the city was the dominant such option. Given the clan’s tra-
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ditional importance in China, it may have been more cost-effective to turn toward the clan
(versus the city) in times of very severe conflict threats. Since the traditional clan was likely
less to have been conducive to market-oriented economic development than the city (e.g.,
Greif 2006, 310-11; Dincecco and Onorato 2017, 43-9; Greif and Tabellini 2017, 13-14), its role
as a safe refuge may have reduced China’s long-run prospects for economic growth.
Finally, our paper contributes to the growing literature on historical state development
in China. Hui (2005) analyzes the relationship between external warfare and state devel-
opment in Ancient China. Sng and Moriguchi (2014) and Ma and Rubin (2017) study fiscal
development under the imperial Qing state. Both works stress the fiscal challenges cre-
ated by China’s vast geographical scale. Ang (2016) analyzes the co-evolution between the
institutional workings of China’s central government and economic markets from the mid-
1970s onward. We view our paper as complementary to these important works. Still, we
go beyond this current literature in several ways. First, we offer a new logic to explain how
internal conflict promoted state formation or state failure in imperial China. This logic em-
phasizes elite perceptions of the central government’s basic viability. Second, the time span
of our analysis is significantly longer than most previous works, as we analyze the rise and
decline of China’s imperial state over nearly one millennium. Third, we take advantage of
new micro-level data and rigorous statistical methods to establish our argument. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first to systematically study the dynamics of conflict, elite
security choices, and state development outcomes over the long run in China. Nonetheless,
our empirical analysis will account for the various factors that the above literature high-
lights, including external warfare, geography, and time trends.
2.2 Internal Conflict and State Strength
A second key debate concerns the implications of internal conflict for state development.
While external warfare is a common explanation for long-run state development (e.g., Tilly
1975), there is relatively less scholarly consensus about the role of internal conflict. On one
hand, internal conflict may promote state formation (e.g., Slater 2010), particularly if mass
threats pose enough of a challenge to incumbent elites to induce them to coalesce around a
stronger central government. On the other hand, internal conflict may promote state failure
(e.g., Bates 2008), by inducing elites to forsake publicly-provided security in favor of private
militias. In Section 3, we will discuss both viewpoints at length.
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Our paper contributes to this literature by showing new evidence that the relationship
between internal conflict and state strength is contingent. Depending on the macro-political
context of basic state viability, our analysis suggests that internal conflict can either pro-
mote state formation (in terms of elite movement away from traditional clans and toward
the imperial government) or state failure (in terms of elite movement back toward clans).
To support these results, we construct a new historical database for China, enabling us to
study the role of institutional change over the long run, and perform a rigorous, multi-part
regression analysis. In turn, our paper offers a new perspective on the different ways in
which internal conflict can influence state development outcomes.
3 Conceptual Framework
External warfare is a traditional explanation for long-run state development (e.g., Tilly 1975;
Brewer 1989; Herbst 2000; Hui 2005). Besley and Persson (2011, 58-9) characterize this rela-
tionship as follows. Military defense is a basic common-interest public good that the state
can provide. If an external attack (or threat) is severe enough, then there may be widespread
demand by citizens to increase investment in the central government’s capacity for military
defense. Once the central government has become stronger, then the marginal cost of sus-
taining it should be relatively low. Thus, a stronger state can remain in place even after the
external attack environment cools down. If external attack threats recur over time, then state
development can continue in a ratchet-like process (Rasler and Thompson 2005, 491-3).2
Internal conflict may also promote state development.3 Slater (2010, 5-7) argues that, in
some contexts, “violent internal contention can ’make the state’ as surely as international
warfare”. Specifically, internal conflict threats from below must pose a severe enough chal-
lenge to the private property and social status of elites. In this context, mass threats in favor
of “radical redistribution” can induce elites to set aside narrow interests and form a col-
lective “protection pact”: namely, a broad-based elite coalition that supports greater state
strength as an institutional safeguard against popular revolt.4
2This traditional explanation is subject to numerous caveats. Centeno (2002, 101-66), for example, argues that
intra-elite divisions, among other factors, severely dampens the relationship between external warfare and
state-making. Similarly, Gennaioli and Voth (2015, 1425-8) argue that, for external warfare to promote state
development, a large revenue imperative must first be crucial to military victory.
3Here, we define internal conflict according to Kalyvas (2006, 17) as “armed combat within the boundaries of
a recognized sovereign entity”.
4Similarly, Rodrı´guez-Franco (2016, 192-5) argues that internal conflict will promote state-making so long as
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Other scholars also claim that the relationship between internal conflict and state strength
may be positive. Blattman and Miguel (2010, 43) note that internal conflict may a) prompt
the central government to exert greater control over a nation’s peripheral zones, and b) boost
central government control over local affairs. Similarly, Weinstein (2005, 14-26) argues that
internal conflict may produce “functional, representative, and self-sustaining” post-conflict
central governments under some circumstances. Namely, the victorious government actors
must have faced high survival threats during the internal conflict, coupled with a sizable
revenue imperative and few external resources available to reduce conflict costs.
On the other hand, internal conflict may promote state failure. Unlike external warfare,
which may induce citizens to invest in military defense as a common-interest public good,
internal conflict by its very nature reflects divergent interests (Besley and Persson 2008, 523).
Bates (2008, 2) argues that, during internal conflict, elites may form private local militias for
security against mass threats. The emergence of private militias in times of internal con-
flict, moreover, may be linked with subsequent state weakness. Central governments may
have political incentives to partner with private militias, thereby reducing the central gov-
ernment’s capacity to establish a monopoly over violence (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos
2013, 7; Staniland 2015, 771; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015, 851). Similarly, Klare (2004,
117) argues that private militias may attempt to supplant any and all signs of the central gov-
ernment’s authority in their zones of operation. Furthermore, private militias may compete
with each other over land, people, and resources, creating even more widespread disorder
(Klare 2004, 116).
Each of the two viewpoints described above makes important points about the potential
implications of internal conflict for state strength. What both viewpoints share is their em-
phasis on elite action as a key mediator between internal conflict and state development out-
comes. With respect to the former viewpoint, internal conflict may promote a “centripetal
effect” that induces elites to make greater investments in the central government as an in-
stitutional bulwark against mass revolt. With respect to the latter viewpoint, by contrast,
internal conflict may promote a “centrifugal effect” that prompts elites to turn away from
the central government and toward private militias for protection.
The extant literature related to both viewpoints, however, tends to focus on the effects
enough elites come to believe that greater state strength is the most effective way to protect their incumbent
social status. Thus, elites will be willing to partner with the state and hand over greater tax funds.
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of internal conflict on state development outcomes within a given macro-political context.
Here, we argue that the basic underlying viability of the central government is a key con-
textual feature that both viewpoints tend to overlook, where “viability” reflects the central
government’s ability to provide some minimum amount of military defense against external
threats, at least in the eyes of elites. We argue that, in the context in which the central gov-
ernment is minimally viable, then it is more likely that the “centripetal effect” will dominate
the “centrifugal effect”. Here, elites will likely prefer to turn away from private militias and
toward the central government for security as their default choice. In the context in which
the central government cannot provide some minimum amount of military defense in the
eyes of elites, however, then the opposite outcome becomes more likely. Namely, elites may
prefer to turn away from the central government and toward private local militias as an
alternative source of protection.
The central government’s basic viability is unlikely to be exogenous to external attack
threats. Indeed, Skocpol (1979, 19-24) argues that the government’s ability to provide do-
mestic security is a function of its relative international standing, writing that “develop-
ments within the international states system as such – especially defeats in wars or threats
of invasion and struggles over colonial controls. . . have helped to undermine existing polit-
ical authorities and state controls, thus opening the way for basic conflicts and structural
transformations” (Skocpol 1979, 23). Even if the central government’s basic viability may
change in response to different levels of external attack threats, however, the precise timing
of this change can be somewhat unpredictable and subject to chance. Hoffman (2015, 19-66)
links the historical development of superior military technology in Europe vis-a`-vis China
to an idiosyncratic process in which four factors – frequent warfare, high military spending,
heavy use of gunpowder technology, and ease of adoption – co-evolved over hundreds of
years. A priori, it was not obvious at which point in time this indigenous process would
“bear fruit” and enable Western powers to truly threaten China’s sovereignty. In our empir-
ical analysis, we will exploit this plausibly exogenous timing of the new globalizing Western
influence in China over the mid-1800s as a critical juncture that will allow us to analyze the
relationships between internal conflict, elite security actions, and state development under
two different macro-political contexts (i.e., whether or not the imperial government was
minimally viable in the eyes of elites). We will discuss this critical juncture at greater length
in Subsection 4.3.
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Summarizing, our simple argument produces two main empirical predictions and one
ancillary prediction.
1. If the central government is minimally viable (as defined above), then it is more likely
that mass rebellion will prompt elites to turn away from private local militias and
toward the central government for security.
2. If the central government is not minimally viable, however, then it becomes more likely
that internal conflict will prompt elites to turn away from the central government and
back toward private local militias for security as an alternative source of security.
A. If enough elites turn away from the central government, then private local militia ac-
tivity can eventually promote state failure.
We will rely on these three predictions to guide our empirical analysis ahead.
4 Qualitative Evidence
We now provide a brief historical overview of violent conflict, elite security actions, and
state development outcomes in China in terms of our conceptual framework.
4.1 Importance of Mass Rebellion
Perry (2002, ix) writes: “No country boasts a more enduring or more colorful history of re-
bellion and revolution than China.” While the majority of historical military conflicts fought
in Western Europe were between rival states, more than 65 percent of those fought in China
were internal (Dincecco and Wang 2018, 343).
One recurrent source of tension was economic inequality between land-owning elites
and landless peasants (Skocpol 1979, 13). The peasantry in China faced a plethora of risks
that threatened ruin (Tawney 1966, 77). Such risks included natural disasters, bad harvests,
heavy taxation, local corruption, and landlord exploitation, any of which could prompt re-
volt by the peasantry (Scott 1976, 114-56; Kung and Ma 2014, 134). Moore (1966, 201-27)
argues that China was historically prone to mass rebellion, because the peasantry did not
fully trust the central government to handle their basic concerns. In this context, mass vio-
lence was a key part of the peasantry’s survival strategy (Perry 1980, 11).
Indeed, mass rebellions were prevalent throughout much of China’s history, from the
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Huang Chao Rebellion of 874-84 (Tackett 2014, 191-206) to the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-69
(Spence 1996, 141). Radical redistributive demands were a prominent feature of peasant
uprisings, as a song popular among the Taiping rebels attests (Spence 1996, 160):
Those with millions owe us their money,
Those who are half poor-half rich can till their fields.
Those with ambitions but no cash should go with us:
Broke or hungry, Heaven will keep you well.
4.2 Elite Action in Mass Rebellion
Mass rebellion posed a serious threat to both the property and lives of land-owning elites,
known collectively as the gentry.5 When nearby peasants took up arms, the gentry had two
basic options. The first was to seek state protection. Skocpol (1979, 49) writes that, tradi-
tionally, the gentry “could not defend against peasant rebellions entirely on a local basis;
they had all come to depend, albeit in varying degrees, upon the centralized monarchical
states to back up their class positions and prerogatives”. Rowe (2007, 28-9) argues that the
imperial government had an “urban bias” when it came to military defense, whereby the
“governing regime defended its walled cities and ceded the countryside to its foes. . . ” From
the Song Dynasty (960-1279) onward, most imperial governments placed their military gar-
risons at or near major urban centers. Originally, such garrisons were intended to defend
border regions, but eventually were established “throughout the heartland of the empire
and served less for external defense than for internal repression” (Kuhn 1970, 21). The Ming
state (1368-1644) constructed hundreds of military garrisons across their territory. In times
of peasant revolt, the gentry could flock to these “walled safe havens” for temporary refuge
(although poorer kin members were often left behind). Fleeing to a walled city during the
revolt itself, and then returning to the countryside once the imperial state had eventually
put it down, was the gentry’s most common response to mass rebellions before 1850 (Rowe
5The gentry were an educated status group comprising the majority of elites in imperial China. Chang (1955,
3) defines the gentry as all holders of academic degrees under the imperial civil service exam system. Al-
though such a degree made an individual qualified for office, most degree holders were not office-holders,
and dwelled in their home districts. There were more than a million members of the gentry during the first
half of 1800s (Chang 1955, 139). Including all kin members, this total amounted to approximately 5.5 million,
or just more than 1 percent of China’s entire population at the time.
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2007, 29).6
The second option in the face of mass rebellion was to organize self-defense among all
kin members, either by constructing fortress protections in the mountains or directly taking
on the rebels with private militias. If the imperial government was no longer minimally
viable in the eyes of the gentry, then they may have been better off protecting themselves
than relying on the state. Clan militarization became a common response by the gentry after
1850 (Rowe 2007, 199-203).
The clan was the primary means through which the gentry organized private collective
defense (Rowe 2007, 65-6). Freedman (1958, 3-4) defines a clan as a lineage organization that
includes all male descendants within five generations of a common male ancestor, along
with any unmarried female agnates and wives of the aforementioned males. During mass
rebellion, the gentry could “conscript” their clan and establish a private militia, if the cen-
tral government was unable to provide sufficient protection. Indeed, many fortresses were
lineage-specific, such as the Yu clan’s Cloud Dragon Fortress and the Xia clan’s Stonewall
Fortress (Rowe 2007, 205).
The formalization of lineage organizations was therefore an important potential action
that the gentry could take to secure personal safety and reduce material risks. In addition to
the construction of ancestral halls, the compilation of genealogical records was the main way
to delineate clan membership.7 These books followed a standard template, starting with an
account of the clan’s origin and history, the growth of its membership over time, and clan
settlement and migration patterns (Hsiao 1960, 334). A main theme of these books was the
maintenance of internal group order. As Rowe (2007, 71) writes:
“Harmony among kinsmen was repeatedly stressed, especially among those of
greater and lesser degrees of wealth. Emphasis was put on the need to maintain
and, in the wake of social crisis, reconstruct accurate genealogical records”.
6Only two such rebellions ultimately succeeded between 1000-1900: the Zhu Yuanzhang Rebellion of the mid-
1300s, which led to the overthrew of the Yuan Dynasty, and the Li Zicheng Rebellion of 1644, which overthrew
the Ming Dynasty.
7Given that the maintenance of such books called for both “the scholar’s pen and landowner’s purse”, they
were most commonly kept by powerful clans; those clans of relatively modest means could not necessarily
afford to produce them (Hsiao 1960, 333-4).
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4.3 Western Influence and the Taiping Rebellion
Skocpol (1979, 48-9) characterizes state-society relations in China prior to the mid-1800s in
terms of an “Ancien Re´gime” equilibrium in which the imperial government and gentry
partnered toward the exploitation of the peasantry. The vast majority of external threats
during this period came from the nomads of the Asian land frontiers (Bai and Kung 2011,
975; Hoffman 2015, 70-2). Nonetheless, the imperial government was generally able to main-
tain its basic viability in the face of this recurrent threat. Skocpol (1979, 67) writes: “Alien
groups might seize the command posts of dynastic rule, but the Chinese imperial system
continued to operate”. In the two cases where the Mongols or Manchus actually conquered
China, both groups were “Sinicized” and kept the imperial system intact (Wakeman 1975,
85; Skocpol 1979, 67). In 1651, just seven years after the Manchu conquest, for example, the
Qing government successfully repressed a peasant rebellion, and land-owning elites were
“decisively convinced” that “they could and should work as partners with the alien dy-
nasty” (Rowe 2007, 157).
Britain’s victory over China in the First Opium War (1839-42), along with the resulting
Treaty of Nanking (1842), served as a critical juncture that fundamentally changed long-
standing Chinese state-society relations (Rosenthal and Wong 2011, 221). As part of this
treaty, the Qing government was forced to pay 21 million silver dollars to Britain and con-
cede control of five ports (Wakeman 1975, 137). This large reparation payment put great
strain on Qing public finances, prompting an “unprecedented financial crisis” (Shi and Xu
2008, 55).
More importantly, military defeat by the West greatly undermined the imperial govern-
ment’s viability in the eyes of the gentry, to the extent that “China’s sheer existence as a
sovereign country was profoundly threatened” (Skocpol 1979, 73). Elite leaders includ-
ing Wei Yuan and Feng Guifen began to call out the imperial government’s political, eco-
nomic, and military weaknesses and advocate for a “self-strengthening” movement (Wake-
man 1975, 181-2). Indeed, a similar critical juncture took place in Japan after the arrival of
the US Navy in the early 1850s, which helped prompt the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate
and the Meiji Restoration (Hall 1970, 151).
Skocpol (1979, 75) argues that the new globalizing Western influence also sparked mass
disturbance in China, the largest of which was the Taiping Rebellion. Led by Hong Xiuquan,
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a schoolteacher who had failed the imperial civil service exam, the Taiping rebels banded
together in 1850. In 1853, they captured the city of Nanjing in Jiangsu Province, declaring
it the capital of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. At the height of its power, the Taiping
controlled nearly 200 counties across five provinces along the lower Yangtze River. With
help from the scholar-official Zeng Guofan and his Hunan Army, the Qing state finally put
down the Taiping Rebellion in 1864.8 Historians have called the Taiping Rebellion “the
largest popular revolt anywhere in the world throughout the nineteenth century” (Anderson
1974, 537), “the bloodiest civil war of all time” (Platt 2012, xxiii), and even the “greatest civil
war in world history” (Ho 1959, 238).
The property and lives of the gentry were severely threatened by the Taiping rebels,
many of whom were peasants that had lost their land due to subsistence risks (Platt 2012,
18). When the Taiping captured the city of Yongan in Guangxi Province in 1851, for example,
they “sent out sizable groups of troops to raid the fugitives’ homes and seize their grain
stores, livestock, salt and cooking oil, and even their clothing” (Spence 1996, 141). During
one raid, approximately 2,000 rebels expropriated two wealthy families, taking “five days
and nights to list and carry away the families’ accumulated stores” (Spence 1996, 141). Upon
the establishment of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1853, its leadership attempted to
implement radical land redistribution (Luo 2009, 753-4). Although this land reform was
unsuccessful (due in large part to recurrent warfare), peasants within Taiping-controlled
zones refused to pay rents to their landlords, burned their tenancy contracts, and sometimes
beat their landlords to death (Luo 2009, 787-810). Outside of Taiping-controlled territory,
there was widespread fear of rebel attack (e.g., Spence 1996, 193).
4.4 Private Militias and Qing State Failure
Platt (2012, 150) argues that the Qing state was “fiscally broken” by the mid-nineteenth
century due to a combination of external and internal turmoil. The Qing military forces
were not typically paid on time, and were in poor fighting shape (Kuhn 1970, 10; Shi and Xu
2008, 58-60; Platt 2012, 118). Furthermore, corruption was rampant (Platt 2012, 119).
In despair, the Xianfeng Emperor (1850-61) reluctantly agreed to allow the gentry to raise
private local militias for protection. Traditional clans played a key role in organizing such
8Meanwhile, several other mass rebellions broke out across Qing territory, including the Nian and Small
Swords Society Rebellions. Most such rebellions were put down in 1869. For this reason, we code the Taiping
Rebellion period as 1850-69.
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militias, both in terms of finance and leadership. Kuhn (1970, 89-92) offers a detailed study
of the militia force within a Hunan county, finding that gentry contributions made up nearly
90 percent of militia expenditures. The gentry also managed the militia’s finances without
Qing oversight. Militia leaders were, moreover, almost always clan leaders (Yang 2012, 335).
To mobilize clan members to join a militia, the clan leader would rely on his lineage ties, and
militias were often named after the leading clan (Yang 2012, 335).
The combined military forces of the Qing state and local militias retook the city of Nan-
jing from the Taiping rebels in 1864, and were able to put down other mass rebellions by
1869. On one hand, this victory brought a period of stability and reform to the Qing gov-
ernment (Wright 1962). Indeed, victory over the Taiping rebels enabled the Qing state to
survive another four decades. On the other hand, by granting the gentry an official govern-
mental role, the Qing’s endorsement of private militias during the Taiping Rebellion may
have eventually tipped the balance of power (Kuhn 1970, 211-25). The gentry were now
formally involved in military defense and public administration. Thus, local political power
moved from the hands of state officials into those of local elites, which according to Kuhn
(1970, 211) led to the “breakdown of the traditional state”.
After defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Qing state established the New
Army in the hope of producing a modern military force that was trained and equipped
according to Western standards. Gradually, however, “New Army officers and weaponry
were absorbed into the framework of the regionally based armies surviving from the time of
the rebellions” (Skocpol 1979, 78), and the gentry leaders, many of whom had been elected
to new provincial legislatures, became local strongmen with control over both taxation and
military matters (Wakeman 1975, 228-32, 235-7).
The Wuchang Uprising, followed by declarations of independence by local military forces
throughout China, prompted the fall of the Qing state in 1911. According to Wakeman (1975,
225), the “Revolution of 1911 can be seen as a series of provincial secessions from the em-
pire, led in every major province but one by officers of the New Army units or by gentry
leaders of the new provincial assemblies.” With respect to the deeper roots of Qing state fail-
ure, Wakeman (1975, 228) highlights the longer-term shift in the power balance toward the
local gentry and away from the central government that had began more than a half-century
before, writing:
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“The fall of the old order was thus the culmination of processes which began
during the 1850s in response to internal rebellion and external aggression: the
development of regional armies, the rise of a rural managerial class, the political
entrenchment of the gentry in provincial government, and so forth. . . the extinc-
tion of the dynastic state was really the handiwork of the new elites that had
emerged during the last half-century of the Qing rule.”
5 Quantitative Data
5.1 Historical Conflict
To construct the historical conflict data, we rely on the Catalog of Historical Wars produced by
the Nanjing Military Academy (2003). This catalog contains detailed information including
dates, locations of individual battles, and leaders for each internal and external conflict that
took place in China from approximately 1000 BCE to the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in
1911. The Catalog derives this information from China’s official historical books, known as
the “twenty-four histories”. Traditionally, each dynasty in China compiled a standardized
history of its predecessor, typically based on official court records. The official historical
books produced as a result of this process are among the most important sources of system-
atic data on Chinese history. Scholars generally treat the official historical books as plausible
historical accounts (Wilkinson 2000, 501). Nonetheless, our regression analysis ahead will
account for potential differences in data quality across time periods (and place) in several
ways.
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on two sorts of historical conflicts found in the
Catalog: mass rebellion and external warfare.
Mass rebellion concerns violent conflict that took place between an imperial government
force and a peasant rebel group. Here, we identify a rebel group as a mass organization
(versus an elite one) so long as its leadership did not hold any official government positions
according to the Catalog.9 The Li Zicheng Rebellion in the late Ming period and the Taiping
9We exclude rebellions led by local elites (e.g., the An Lushan Rebellion in the late Tang period), because
such rebellions did not typically pose significant redistributive threats. Rather, the goal of elite rebels was
generally to gain regional independence. Nonetheless, we control for elite rebellions as a robustness check in
our regression analysis (Appendix Table A.8). Our main results remain unchanged, and there is no significant
relationship between elite rebellion and clan activity. Appendix Table A.2 breaks down the distribution of
conflict types in our sample.
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Rebellion in the late Qing period (which we will analyze in depth in Subsection 7.2) are
two examples of mass rebellion included in the Catalog. Our sample data consist of 1,184
individual battles linked to 601 recorded mass rebellions between 1000 and 1900. Figure 1
maps the mass rebellion battle locations, which took place all throughout China.
External warfare concerns violent conflict between a China-based dynasty and a non-
Han state or state-like power (i.e., whether China-based or not, but not ethnically Han).
Examples include the wars of the Song Dynasty versus the Khitans and later the Jurchens,
and those of the Qing dynasty versus the British. There were 1,234 individual battles linked
to 544 recorded external wars during our sample period. Appendix Figure A.1 provides
a map of these external battles. Consistent with the evidence cited in Subsection 4.3, the
geographical pattern suggests that the majority of external conflicts were fought against
nomads from the Eurasian Steppe.
5.2 Historical Genealogy
Wang (2008) has cataloged roughly 51,200 genealogy books from 1005 to 2007 in a print
registry. This effort represents the most comprehensive registry of known Chinese clan ge-
nealogies to date (Greif and Tabellini 2017, 2). Each entry in this registry reports a record
of a clan’s genealogy book, including the year in which it was compiled. A clan may have
had multiple registry entries. For example, the Li clan based in the city of Taiyuan compiled
its first genealogy book in 1701 (entry 1), which it then updated in 1754 (entry 2) and 1802
(entry 3), for a total of three genealogy books. Each entry also includes information on the
clan’s surname and current (at the time) location.
We digitized this entire print registry, and geocoded each genealogy book based on its
reported location. To the best of our knowledge, this geocoding is the first such effort of its
kind. We first used optical character recognition software to read the entire registry into a
Microsoft Excel file. Next, with the help of research assistants, we manually checked each
entry in order to ensure accuracy. Finally, we relied on the China Historical Geographic In-
formation System (2018) for latitudes and longitudes for the purposes of geocoding. Figure 2
maps the number of recorded genealogy books written down for our sample period. Consis-
tent with previous qualitative evidence (e.g., Freedman 1958, 129), the geographical pattern
suggests that historical clan activity was more prevalent in the South than in the North.
Genealogy books provide a unique measure of local elite action in China across time
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that is not only feasible, given historical data limitations, but is also systematic. Nonethe-
less, data concerns may remain. Measurement error is one such concern. Elites may have
found it difficult to compile genealogy books during internal conflicts, and these books may
have been less likely to survive and be cataloged. If true, then we should observe fewer
genealogy books in counties that experienced “too many” rebellions. To address this con-
cern, we include a quadratic term for mass rebellion as a robustness check (Appendix Table
A.5). Another concern is that the compilation of genealogy books may have been sensitive
to changing economic conditions, cultural trends towards conservatism, and migration pat-
terns. To account for such potential confounders, our regression analysis ahead will include
county and period fixed effects and province-specific time trends.
5.3 Panel Database
To maximize informational content, we combined the geocoded historical conflict and ge-
nealogy data into a panel database at the county level. We first divided the 1000-1900 period
into 18 50-year periods (e.g., 1000-49, 1050-99, etc.). This periodization makes sense because,
as a rule of thumb, genealogy books were generally revised roughly every 50 years.10 We
then conjoined the geocoded conflict and genealogy data (points) with the county shape-
file (polygons) from the China Historical Geographic Information System (2018).11 In total, the
panel database consists of N = 2, 372 (counties) and T = 18 (50-year periods).
6 Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity Before 1850
To systematically analyze the relationship between mass rebellion and clan activity in China
between 1000 and 1849, we now undertake a regression analysis.
6.1 Panel Analysis, 1000-1849
We estimate the following benchmark OLS specification:
ClanActivityi,t = α+ βRebellioni,t + µi + λt + ei,t. (1)
10Traditionally, there was the general expectation that a clan should update its genealogy book every three
generations as a matter of filial piety (Feng 2006, 67). Given that males typically married and had their first
child in their late teens (Chaffee 1989, 345), three generations translates into 3× 18 = 54 years, or roughly
one half-century.
11This shapefile is based on the 1990 census. Average country size is 3,987 square kilometers. To help account
for the potential arbitrariness of county borders, our regression analysis ahead will also make use of conflict
and genealogy totals for neighboring counties.
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The dependent variable ClanActivityi,t reflects clan activity in county i over 50-year period
t as proxied by the number of genealogy books written down there. The variable of interest
Rebellioni,t measures the number of mass rebellions in each county per 50-year period. µi
and λt are county and period fixed effects, respectively. ei,t is a random error term. All
standard errors are robust, clustered at the county level to account for any within-county
serial correlation in the error term. Appendix Table A.1 displays the summary statistics for
all of the regression variables used in our analysis.
The genealogy data increase in mean and variance across time, particularly before and
after 1850. To account for this issue, we take the natural logarithm of the dependent variable,
adding a small number such that ClanActivityi,t ≡ ln(0.01 + GenealogyBooksi,t). This log
transformation reduces the range of the mean and variance of ClanActivityi,t, and allows
us to make use of all observations.12 Beyond this log transformation, we exclude the post-
1850 period for our current analysis (we will include it in Section 7). Period fixed effects
µi also help account for the rightward skew of ClanActivityi,t. Finally, given that the mean
and variance of Rebellioni,t does not display any obvious increase over time, we keep this
variable in its original linear form.
To help account for unobservable features that may have affected both clan activity and
mass rebellions alike, our analysis always include county and period fixed effects. County
fixed effects help control for local initial conditions (e.g., demographic, economic) and local
features that are time-invariant including local geography (e.g., soil quality, terrain rugged-
ness), while period fixed effects help control for widespread shocks (e.g., cultural, economic)
specific to each 50-year interval.
Nonetheless, unobserved time-varying features may still affect the results of our analysis.
To address this possibility, we add province-specific linear time trends to our benchmark
specification, which help account for unobservable regional features that may have changed
over time, including regional cultural, demographic, economic, political, military, religious,
and urbanization patterns. To further account for the role of heterogeneity across place and
time, we exclude provinces and periods one by one (Appendix Figures A.2 and A.3).
Reverse causation is another potential threat to inference. Namely, clan activity levels in
period t may influence the chance of rebellion in period t + 1. Province-specific trends help
12The main results remain robust if we a) take ln(1 + GenealogyBooksi,t) rather than ln(0.01 +
GenealogyBooksi,t), or b) keep the dependent variable in its original linear form (Appendix Table A.3).
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control for regional trends in clan activity over time. To explicitly account for the level of
clan activity in the previous period, moreover, we include the lagged dependent variable
ClanActivityi,t−1 as an independent regressor (Appendix Table A.6). Finally, we perform
placebo tests equivalent to the first lead of our variable of interest (Appendix Table A.7).
Table 1 shows the main estimation results for the relationship between mass rebellion and
clan activity in China from 1000 to 1849. The benchmark specification in column 1 controls
for time-invariant local features and widespread time-specific shocks through fixed effects.
The coefficient estimate for Rebellioni,t is negative in sign (-0.093) and highly significant.
This result is consistent with our prediction from Section 3 that mass rebellion reduced clan
activity prior to 1850.
To help control for unobserved changes over time in regional features (e.g., demographic
and economic patterns), column 2 adds province-specific trends to the benchmark fixed
effects specification. The coefficient estimate for Rebellioni,t remains highly significant, with
value -0.070. This result suggests that unobserved time-varying regional features do not
drive our main result.
Beyond mass rebellion within a given county, rebellion battles in neighboring counties
may have also influenced clan activity there. To evaluate this possibility, column 3 adds
the variable RebellionNeighbori,t to the previous specification. This variable includes mass
rebellion data for all counties that border county i. Once more, the coefficient estimate for
Rebellioni,t is negative (-0.064) and highly significant. Consistent with the logic outlined just
above, the coefficient for RebellionNeighbori,t is also negative and significant. The size of this
coefficient is relatively small (-0.014), however, suggesting that mass rebellion within a given
county was of greater importance to local clan activity than that in neighboring counties.
As also described in Section 3, external warfare may have created greater demand for
the provision of military defense by the central government as a common-interest public
good (e.g., Tilly 1975). If true, then we should observe a negative relationship between ex-
ternal warfare and clan activity, as elites turned away from the private provision of military
defense through the traditional clan. Column 4 adds the variable ExternalWari,t. This vari-
able includes data for each individual external warfare battle in county i between 1000 and
1849. The coefficient estimate for Rebellioni,t is again negative (-0.069) and highly significant.
Consistent with the above logic, the coefficient estimate for ExternalWari,t is also negative
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and significant. This result is consistent with the logic whereby external warfare helped
“make” the imperial Chinese government. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate for
ExternalWari,t is roughly half the size of that for Rebellioni,t, however, suggesting that mass
rebellion was of greater importance than external warfare in reducing clan activity.
Overall, the Table 1 results support the first prediction of our conceptual framework that
mass rebellion will reduce clan activity when there is a minimally viable imperial govern-
ment. The coefficient estimates suggest that each additional mass rebellion battle was asso-
ciated with a 7 to 10 percent decrease in clan activity (as proxied by the number of genealogy
books written down) between 1000 and 1849. These magnitudes are sizable. Mean clan ac-
tivity in terms of the number of genealogy books was 0.136 over this period. Thus, our most
conservative coefficient estimate suggests that the reduction in clan activity associated with
greater mass rebellion can account for approximately half of total clan activity.
We further test the robustness of the above results in a wide variety of ways, includ-
ing alternative specifications of the dependent variable, the lagged variable of interest, the
quadratic variable of interest, alternative samples, the lagged dependent variable, placebo
tests, and controlling for elite rebellions. The main results remain robust across all such
checks. To save space, we relegate the discussion of these robustness checks to the Online
Appendix.
6.2 Ming Garrison Construction
Thus far, we have shown evidence for a negative and highly significant relationship between
mass rebellion and clan activity between 1000 and 1849. This evidence is consistent with
the argument that elites turned away from the traditional clan in times of internal conflict.
Here, the implicit implication is that elites turned toward the imperial government vis-a`-vis
the clan for safety. Due to a lack of available historical data on the local viability of the
imperial government, however, it is difficult to explicitly test such an implication. To proxy
for the ability of elites to turn toward the imperial state for protection, we use geocoded data
on the location of each new military garrison established during the first century of Ming
rule (1368-1467) according to the China Historical Geographic Information System (2018). Upon
taking power, the Ming embarked on an ambitious garrison construction plan, the main
function of which was to help suppress mass revolt (Downing 1992, 50). Nearly 95 percent
of Ming-era garrisons (i.e., 375 in total) were built during the first 100 years of Ming rule.
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Given that military garrisons provided a safe refuge for elites in times of mass rebellion
(as described in Subsection 4.2), this variable makes conceptual sense as a measure of the
imperial government’s local strength relative to the clan. Furthermore, this approach is
feasible, given the paucity of local historical data on the imperial government’s reach.
We use this information to create two different dependent variables. For reasons sim-
ilar to those described in Subsection 6.1, the first takes the natural logarithm of the num-
ber of garrisons built in county i between 1368-1467 and adds a small number: ln(0.01 +
Garrisonsi,1368−1467).13 The second computes the inverse distance (in kilometers) from the
centroid of each county to the nearest Ming-era garrison. This variable is increasing in the
number of garrisons located closer to a county. Here, our variable of interest is the number
of mass rebellions in county i over the 1368-1467 period, of which there were 121 in total.
Given that this test uses cross-sectional data, we can no longer include county fixed ef-
fects as in our previous analysis. We address the possibility of omitted variable bias in this
context in two ways. First, to help control for institutional features specific to each region, we
include prefectural fixed effects. The prefectural level is the administrative unit just above
the county level. Second, to help account for local observable (i.e., agricultural, economic,
and geographical) features, we include several county-level control variables: latitude and
longitude, distance to coast (log), distance to major rivers (log), distance to provincial capital
(log), mean elevation, mean slope, mean agricultural suitability for rain-red rice, and mean
agricultural suitability for irrigated rice.14
Table 2 displays the results of this analysis. Column 1 shows the raw bivariate corre-
lation between mass rebellion and the establishment of Ming-era garrisons as proxied by
ln(0.01 + Garrisonsi,1368−1467), while column 2 adds prefectural fixed effects, and column
3 adds the county-level control variables as described above. The coefficient estimate for
Rebellioni,1368−1467 is positive in sign and highly significant across all three specifications,
with values between 0.691 and 0.720. The magnitudes of these estimates suggest that each
additional mass rebellion battle during the first century of Ming rule was associated with
13The main results remain robust, however, if we keep this dependent variable in its original linear form
(Appendix Table A.9).
14The latitude and longitude variables, and all of the distance-related controls, are measured at (or from) the
centroid of each county. The unit for the distance-related controls is kilometers. The geographical data are
from the China Historical Geographic Information System (2018). The agricultural suitability data are computed
based on the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2018).
23
the establishment of a new military garrison.
In columns 4 to 6, we repeat the above regressions for the alternative dependent variable,
1/DistanceNearestGarrison. The coefficient estimates for Rebellioni,1368−1467 are positive in
sign and highly significant across all three specifications.
Overall, these results are consistent with the implication of our argument that elites ac-
tively turned toward the imperial government for safety in times of mass rebellion.
7 Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity After 1850
The results in the previous section supports the first prediction of our argument that mass
rebellion reduced clan activity and promoted state formation in the macro-political context
in China when elites viewed the imperial government as viable. We now turn to examine
our second prediction that when the central government is not minimally viable in the eyes
of elites, then it is more likely that internal conflict will prompt them to turn toward private
local militias for security.
7.1 Panel Analysis, 1000-1900
In Table 3, we repeat the main analysis based on Equation 1 after including the 1850-1900
period. The coefficient estimates for Rebellioni,t now switch signs: the relationship between
mass rebellion and clan activity is significantly positive across all four specifications. These
results support the second prediction of our conceptual framework. Namely, if the imperial
government was no longer minimally viable, then elites would turn back to the traditional
clan as an alternative source of protection. Here, the coefficient estimates suggest that, once
we take the new globalizing Western influence into account as a critical juncture in imperial
China’s history, then each additional mass rebellion battle was associated with a 7 to 10
percent increase in clan activity (as proxied by the number of genealogy books written down).
7.2 Taiping Rebellion
The regression analysis so far is consistent with the argument that the relationship between
mass rebellion and clan activity in imperial China was contingent. If the imperial govern-
ment was minimally viable (i.e., pre-1850), then mass rebellion would reduce clan activity,
as elites sought protection from the state. If the imperial government was not minimally
viable (i.e., post-1850 China), however, then elites would turn back to the traditional clan for
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safety.
To further improve our understanding of the context in which a change in the state’s vi-
ability alters local elite action, we now turn to an in-depth analysis of the Taiping Rebellion.
The Taiping Rebellion provides an ideal case study for at least two reasons. First, the Taip-
ing Rebellion is without historical parallel in terms of scale (as described in Subsection 4.3).
Second, as we will show, this event may be linked with the eventual failure of the imperial
Qing state in 1911.
Figure 3 (top panel) indicates that mass rebellions over the nineteenth century peaked
during 1850-69. There were 230 mass rebellion battles over this period, of which nearly 60
percent involved the Taiping (the remainder involved other rebel groups such as the Nian).
There was also a sizable increase in clan activity in the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion
(Figure 3, bottom panel). The number of genealogy books rose from less than 100 per year
before 1850 to nearly 200 by 1870. This descriptive evidence is consistent with the second
prediction of our conceptual framework that elites turned back to the traditional clan for
protection in the absence of a viable imperial government.
Similarly, Appendix Figure A.5 plots average clan activity trends for counties that expe-
rienced at least one mass rebellion battle during the Taiping Rebellion versus those that did
not. While both groups of counties followed relatively similar trend lines prior to the start
of the Taiping Rebellion, there was a notable increase in the slope of the trend line for the
former group (but much less so for the latter group) during the Taiping Rebellion itself.
To systematically analyze pre- and post-Taiping clan activity, we estimate the following
OLS specification:
ClanActivityi,t = α+ βPeriodi × Rebellioni,1850−69
+ µi + λt + ei,t.
(2)
ClanActivityi,t is defined as in Section 6, although it now reflects clan activity in county i
over each 20-year period t (versus each 50-year period as before) between 1810 and 1889
(i.e., 1810-29, 1830-49, 1850-69, 1870-89). As we will describe ahead, our results are robust
to different ways to divide these time periods. The treatment variable is Rebellioni,1850−69,
which measures the number of mass rebellions in county i during the Taiping Rebellion.
Periodi is a binary indicator variable for the different 20-year periods during 1810-89. The
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quantity of interest is Periodi × Rebellioni,1850−69. According to the second prediction of our
conceptual framework, we expect the coefficient value β on this estimator to be positive in
sign and statistically significant. In other words, we expect clan activity to increase from
1830-49 to 1870-89 in counties that experienced more rebellions during 1850-69. µi and λt
are county and period fixed effects, respectively.15 ei,t is a random error term. All standard
errors are robust, clustered at the county level.
In column 1 of Table 4, we first test the common trends assumption using the two 20-
year pre-treatment periods (1810-29+1830-49). The coefficient estimate is relatively small
in magnitude and statistically insignificant. These results suggest that counties followed a
common trend in clan activity prior to the Taiping Rebellion.
Column 2 of this table shows our main coefficient estimate. Counties that underwent
more mass rebellion battles during 1850-69 experienced a positive and highly significant
change in clan activity (as proxied by the number of genealogy books written down) be-
tween 1830-49 and 1870-89. These results are also robust to dividing up the time periods
into 15-year or 25-year periods (Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11).
Overall, the results in Table 4 provide support for the second prediction of our concep-
tual framework that elites turned back to the traditional clan for protection in the absence
of a minimally viable state. The coefficient estimate suggests that each additional Taiping
Rebellion battle was associated with a more than 50 percent increase in post-rebellion clan
activity.
8 Clan Activity and Qing State Failure
A final implication of our conceptual framework is that renewed clan activity could even-
tually promote state failure. As described in Subsection 4.4, the large increase in clan ac-
tivity and their private militias in the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion changed the long-
standing balance of power between the Qing state and the local gentry. These elites began
to mobilize greater local resources and increase local autonomy.
To proxy for local resistance to Qing rule, we geocode the location of each elite group
that declared independence from the Qing state in 1911 according to Guo (2015). Appendix
Figure A.6 shows the locations of these revolutionary elite groups. We then use this infor-
15In this specification, the county fixed effect absorbs the constitutive term for Rebellioni,1850−69.
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mation to create a binary indicator variable Independencei,1911 that equals one if there was
at least one independence declaration by a local elite group within the borders of county
i. Here, our variable of interest is post-Taiping clan activity (as proxied by the number of
genealogy books written down) between 1890-1909. Given that this test uses cross-sectional
data (and thus we can no longer include county fixed effects), we address the possibility of
omitted variable bias in the same two ways as in Subsection 6.2: prefectural fixed effects
and county-level control variables for local (i.e., agricultural, economic, and geographical)
observables.16 Table 5 displays the results of this analysis. Column 1 shows the raw bivari-
ate correlation, column 2 adds prefectural fixed effects, and column 3 adds the county-level
control variables. The coefficient estimate for ClanActivityi,1890−1909 is positive in sign and
highly significant across all three specifications, with values ranging from 0.011 to 0.013. The
magnitudes of these estimates suggest that a 50 percent increase in post-Taiping clan activity
(as proxied by the number of genealogy books written down) was associated with a 0.19 to
0.23 percent increase in the likelihood of a local independence declaration in 1911.
The Taiping Rebellion itself is one potential confounder here. It may be that conflict
exposure during the Taiping Rebellion, rather than the large increase in subsequent clan
activity, prompted local resistance to the Qing state. To evaluate this possibility, column 4
adds Rebellioni,1850−69, which measures the number of mass rebellions in county i during the
Taiping Rebellion, as a control variable. The coefficient estimate for ClanActivityi,1890−1909
remains stable in magnitude and significance. The coefficient estimate for Rebellioni,1850−69
is also positive in sign and highly significant. This result is consistent with the logic that
greater clan activity was not the only channel through which the Taiping Rebellion pro-
moted Qing state failure.
Bai and Jia (2016) argue that counties that had higher quotas for the imperial civil service
exam were more likely to experience revolutionary uprisings once this system was abolished
in 1905. To account for this alternative explanation for Qing state failure, we control for
such quotas (ExamQuotai) in column 5.17 The coefficient estimate for ClanActivityi,1890−1909
falls slightly in magnitude to 0.009, but remains highly significant. Consistent with Bai and
16To the previous list of county-level control variables, we add “initial” population density in 1820 (the only
year in which such historical data are systematically available at the local level) in persons/km2 according
to Cao (2001).
17We rely on the same source as Bai and Jia (2016) for the Qing exam quota data: the Imperially Established
Institutes and Laws of the Great Qing Dynasty of Kun (1899, vols. 371-80).
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Jia’s (2016) argument, the coefficient estimate for ExamQuotai is also positive and highly
significant.
Finally, in column 6, we include all of the above covariates. The results are very similar
as before.
Overall, these results are consistent with the implication of our conceptual framework
that a large increase in clan activity can eventually lead to state failure.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the long-run dynamics of internal conflict, elite action over
privately- versus publicly-provided security, and state development outcomes in China. We
have argued that whether internal conflict promotes state formation or state failure de-
pended on the imperial government’s basic viability in the eyes of elites, particularly in
terms of its capacity to provide adequate military defense against external attack threats. If
the imperial government was minimally viable, then it likely made the most sense for elites
to turn away from traditional clans and toward the imperial government for safety in times
of internal conflict. If, however, the imperial government was no longer minimally viable,
then elites may have preferred to turn back toward traditional clans and their private mili-
tias as an alternative source of security. Renewed clan activity, moreover, could eventually
promote state failure, if enough elites turned away from the imperial government.
To evaluate the predictions of our argument, we have exploited new county-level panel
data for China that span nearly 1,000 years, from 1000 to 1911. We have shown evidence
that, prior to 1850, elites turned away from traditional clans and toward the imperial gov-
ernment for safety in times of mass rebellion. This relationship fundamentally changed,
however, after the new globalizing Western influence took hold in China over the mid-1800s,
threatening the imperial government’s basic viability in the eyes of elites. In turn, we have
found that elites turned back toward clans for protection, particularly during the Taiping
Rebellion. Finally, we have shown evidence for a positive relationship between renewed
clan activity in the post-Taiping period and the eventual failure of the imperial Qing state in
1911.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is among the first to provide systematic evi-
dence that internal conflict first promoted state formation (i.e., pre-1850) in China, but later
28
promoted the revival of the traditional clan and state failure (i.e., post-1850). Neither re-
newed clan strength nor major state weakness is likely to be favorable to modern economic
growth. Thus, our analysis provides a novel perspective on the political origins of the Great
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Figure 1: Mass Rebellion Locations, 1000-1900
Notes. This figure shows the location of each recorded mass rebellion battle in China between 1000-1900.
County lines are for 1990 borders.
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Figure 2: Clan Activity, 1000-1900
Notes. This figure shows the number of recorded genealogy books written down between 1000-1900 by county.
Counties are shaded by quintile, whereby those in the top quintile receive the darkest shade. County lines are
for 1990 borders.
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Figure 3: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity, 1800-1900
Notes. This figure shows the annual number of mass rebellion battles (top panel) and genealogy books written
down (bottom panel) between 1800 and 1900. The (red) solid line indicates the number of mass rebellions per
year, and the (blue) dashed line indicates the number of genealogy books.
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Table 1: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Main Results
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mass rebellion -0.093∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
[0.000] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003]






County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trend No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.243 0.244 0.244
Observations 40324 40324 40324 40324
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. All regres-
sions include county and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Mass Rebellion and Ming Military Garrisons
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Garrisons) 1/Distance to Nearest Garrison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mass rebellion 0.720∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.159) (0.149) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Prefectural FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County-level controls No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.034 0.233 0.267 0.005 0.783 0.792
Observations 2372 2372 2365 2372 2372 2365
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county. Sample period is first century of Ming
Dynasty (1368-1467). Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is early Ming military garrisons as proxied by
ln(0.01 + Garrisons), and in columns 4-6 it is the inverse distance (in km) from the county centroid to the
nearest such garrison. Variable of interest is number of mass rebellions over this sample period. County-
level controls include latitude and longitude, distance to coast (log), distance to major rivers (log), distance to
provincial capital (log), mean elevation, mean slope, mean agricultural suitability for rain-red rice, and mean
agricultural suitability for irrigated rice. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses, fol-
lowed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 3: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Include 1850-1900
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mass rebellion 0.097∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
[0.029] [0.031] [0.067] [0.028]






County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.182 0.315 0.315 0.315
Observations 42696 42696 42696 42696
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1900. All regres-
sions include county and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Clan Activity Before and After Taiping Rebellion
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
[1810-29]+[1830-49] [1830-49]+[1870-89]
(1) (2)
Period (1830-49)*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.124
(0.114)
[0.278]
Period (1870-89)*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.420∗∗∗
(0.157)
[0.007]
County FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
R2 0.830 0.827
Observations 4744 4744
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Column 1 includes data for 1810-29 and
1830-49. Column 2 includes data for 1830-49 and 1870-89. All specifications include county and period fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Clan Activity and Qing State Failure
Dependent variable: Declaration of Independence in 1911
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.005]
Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.019) (0.023)
[0.000] [0.015]
Civil service exam quota 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.001] [0.017]
Prefectural FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level controls No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.023 0.174 0.188 0.192 0.261 0.280
Observations 2372 2372 2281 2372 1583 1554
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county. Dependent variable is binary indicator of formal
declaration of independence from Qing state in 1911 by county. Variable of interest is clan activity as proxied
by ln(0.01 + GenealogyBooks) between 1890-1909. County-level control variables include latitude and longi-
tude, distance to coast (log), distance to major rivers (log), distance to provincial capital (log), mean elevation,
mean slope, initial population density, mean agricultural suitability for rain-red rice, and mean agricultural
suitability for irrigated rice. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses, followed by




Internal Conflict, Elite Action, and State Failure
Robustness Checks for Panel Regression Analysis, 1000-1849
Alternative Specifications of Dependent Variable
The main analysis in Section 6 of the paper defines ClanActivityi,t as ln(0.01+GenealogyBooksi,t).
Appendix Table A.3 shows that our main results are robust to two alternative ways to spec-
ify the dependent variable. In columns 1 to 4, we take ln(1 + GenealogyBooksi,t) rather than
ln(0.01 + GenealogyBooksi,t), while in columns 5 to 8, we keep ClanActivityi,t in its original
linear form GenealogyBooksi,t. The results remain negative in sign and highly significant
across all eight specifications.
Lagged Variable of Interest
The influence of mass rebellion on clan activity may not be contemporaneous. Put differ-
ently, clan activity in period t may be a function of mass rebellion in period t− 1 rather than
in period t. To evaluate this possibility, Appendix Table A.4 repeats the main analysis for
the lagged (versus the contemporaneous) variable of interest Rebellioni,t−1. The results are
always negative in sign and highly significant. Furthermore, the coefficient magnitudes for
Rebellioni,t−1 are similar in size to those for Rebellioni,t in the main results. Thus, our results
do not depend on whether we use the contemporaneous or the lagged term of our variable
of interest.
Quadratic Variable of Interest
Counties that experienced “too many” rebellions may have witnessed greater clan activity
even prior to 1850, as elites turned back to the traditional clan for protection. To address this
possibility, Appendix Table A.5 adds the quadratic term Rebellion2i,t. The coefficient estimate
for Rebellioni,t remains negative and highly significant, with value -0.107. The coefficient
estimate for Rebellion2i,t does in fact turn positive and significant. However, this coefficient
magnitude is relatively small (0.018). Furthermore, this positive effect does not apply until
six mass rebellion battles (per 50-year period) were reached; most counties were exposed to
less than six such battles through 1849.
Alternative Samples
The main analysis controls for unobserved heterogeneity across place and time by including
county and period fixed effects and province-specific trends. To further account for the role
of heterogeneity across place, Appendix Figure A.2 excludes sample provinces one at a time
A1
for the regression model in column 2 of Table 1. The coefficient estimates for Rebellioni,t re-
main relatively stable, and are always significant. Similarly, as an additional way to account
for the role of heterogeneity across time, Figure A.3 shows the results after excluding each
50-year period one by one. Once more, the coefficient estimates for Rebellioni,t are always
negative in sign and significant. Overall, these tests provide further evidence that the main
results are robust across place and time.
Lagged Dependent Variable
The main analysis controls for regional patterns in clan activity over time by including
province-specific trends. The level of clan activity in the previous period t − 1, however,
may still influence the chance of mass rebellion in period t. To further account for this
possibility, Appendix Table A.6 includes the lagged dependent variable ClanActivityi,t−1 as
an independent regressor. The coefficient estimates for ClanActivityi,t−1 are positive and
highly significant, indicating that clan strength today is partly a function of previous clan
activity. While the coefficient estimates for Rebellioni,t fall slightly in magnitude relative to
the main results, they remain negative in sign and highly significant across all four speci-
fications. Thus, controlling for previous clan strength does not change the main results by
much.18
Placebo Tests
As another way to account for the possibility of reverse causation, we create a placebo vari-
able Rebellioni,t+1 equal to the first lead of our variable of interest. For example, if the de-
pendent variable ClanActivityi,t measures clan activity between 1100-49, then the placebo
variable Rebellioni,t+1 measures the number of mass rebellions between 1150-99 (versus our
variable of interest Rebellioni,t, which measures the number of contemporaneous mass re-
bellions between 1100-49). If the placebo coefficient estimate is not significant, then this test
will provide further evidence that the main relationship runs from mass rebellion to clan
activity, and not vice versa. Appendix Table A.7 shows the placebo test results. The placebo
coefficient estimates are never significant. Furthermore, relative to our variable of interest,
they also switch signs (the placebo coefficient estimates are always positive). Overall, the
placebo tests results provides further evidence in favor of our interpretation of the main re-
18Including the lagged dependent variable induces asymptotic bias of order 1/T (Nickell 1981). Given that
T = 17 in our pre-1850 panel, however, Nickell bias should be relatively small.
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sults, namely that there is a robust relationship running from mass rebellion to clan activity,
but not the other way around.
Elite Rebellion
Beyond mass rebellion, elite rebellion was another form of violent internal conflict in im-
perial China. We identify rebel groups as elite if its leadership held official government
positions according to the Catalog of Historical Wars. Unlike mass rebellion, the goal of elite
rebellions was generally to gain regional independence, and such rebellions did not typi-
cally pose significant redistributive threats. Appendix Table A.8 adds the number of elite
rebellions per 50-year period as a control in the main analysis. As expected, there is no sig-
nificant relationship between elite rebellion and clan activity, and our main results remain
unchanged.
A3
Figure A.1: External War Locations, 1000-1900
Notes. This figure shows the location of each recorded external war battle in China between 1000-1900. County
lines are for 1990 borders.
A4
Figure A.2: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Exclude Provinces One by One
Notes. Sample period is 1000-1849. Each black dot represents point estimate for regression model in column 2
of Table 1 when we exclude each province one by one. Horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.
A5
Figure A.3: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Exclude 50-Year Periods One by One
Notes. Sample period is 1000-1849. Each black dot represents point estimate for regression model in column
2 of Table 1 when we exclude each 50-year period one by one. Horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence
intervals.
A6
Figure A.4: Ming Military Garrison Locations, 1368-1467
Notes. This figure shows the location of each state military garrison in China established under the first century
of Ming rule (1368-1467). County lines are for 1990 borders.
A7
Figure A.5: Clan Activity Trends Before and After Taiping Rebellion
Notes. This figure shows the change in average clan activity as proxied by ln(0.01 + GenealogyBooks) for
counties that experienced at least one mass rebellion battle during the Taiping Rebellion between 1850-69
(treatment group) and those that did not (control group). Shaded vertical line represents start of Taiping
Rebellion in 1850. Horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.
A8
Figure A.6: Declarations of Independence, 1911
Notes. This figure shows the locations of elite groups that made a formal declaration of independence from the
Qing state in 1911. County lines are for 1990 borders.
A9
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
A: Panel Analysis, 1000-1850
Genealogy books 40324 0.136 1.792 0.000 126.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books) 40324 −4.436 0.951 −4.605 4.836
Mass rebellion 40324 0.023 0.182 0.000 7.000
Mass rebellion (neighbor) 40324 0.135 0.520 0.000 9.000
External war 40324 0.028 0.252 0.000 12.000
Elite rebellion 40324 0.013 0.129 0.000 4.000
B: Panel Analysis, 1000-1900
Genealogy books 42696 0.298 4.000 0.000 230.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books) 42696 −4.353 1.176 −4.605 5.438
Mass rebellion 42696 0.027 0.202 0.000 8.000
Mass rebellion (neighbor) 42696 0.158 0.592 0.000 16.000
External war 42696 0.027 0.246 0.000 12.000
C: Ming Cross-Sectional Analysis, 1368-1467
Garrisons 2372 0.138 0.543 0.000 6.000
ln(0.01+Garrisons) 2372 −4.154 1.418 −4.605 1.793
Distance to nearest garrison 2372 184.015 330.884 0.223 2189.455
1/Distance to nearest garrison 2372 0.029 0.108 0.000 4.481
Mass rebellion 2372 0.049 0.365 0.000 11.000
D: Taiping Difference-in-Differences Analysis, 1810-89
Genealogy books, 1810-29 2372 0.432 2.395 0.000 50.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books), 1810-29 2372 −4.022 1.703 −4.605 3.912
Genealogy books, 1830-49 2372 0.577 3.115 0.000 61.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books), 1830-49 2372 −3.893 1.866 −4.605 4.111
Genealogy books, 1870-89 2372 1.298 6.916 0.000 115.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books), 1870-89 2372 −3.549 2.249 −4.605 4.745
Mass rebellion, 1850-69 2372 0.094 0.400 0.000 8.000
E: Qing Cross-Sectional Analysis, 1890-1911
Declaration of independence in 1911 2372 0.039 0.193 0.000 1.000
Genealogy books 2372 1.764 8.626 0.000 124.000
Ln(0.01+Genealogy books) 2372 −3.334 2.428 −4.605 4.820
Civil service exam quota 1583 11.030 7.024 0.000 26.000
Mass rebellion, 1850-69 2372 0.094 0.400 0.000 8.000
F: County-Level Control Variables in Cross-Sectional Analyses in Panels C and E
Latitude 2372 32.964 6.607 7.398 52.934
Longitude 2372 111.155 9.550 74.899 134.276
Area 2372 3986.947 9866.033 3.017 200191.625
Distance to coast (log) 2372 5.492 1.917 0.000 8.081
Distance to major rivers (log) 2372 4.275 2.206 0.000 7.770
Distance to provincial capital (log) 2372 4.932 1.018 0.000 7.379
Mean elevation 2370 0.851 1.096 −0.988 5.152
Mean slope 2370 2.603 2.512 0.013 15.661
Mean agricultural suitability for rain-fed rice 2365 0.381 0.486 0.000 1.000
Mean agricultural suitability for irrigated rice 2365 0.683 0.465 0.000 1.000
Notes. See text for variable descriptions and data sources.
A10
Table A.2: Conflict Types, 1000-1900
N %
Mass rebellion 1184 39.732
External war 1234 41.409
Elite rebellion 562 18.859
Total 2980 100.000












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Lagged Variable of Interest
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Mass rebellion -0.105∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]






County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.248 0.248 0.249
Observations 37952 37952 37952 37952
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. All regres-
sions include county and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table A.5: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Quadratic Variable of Interest













Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. Regression
include county and period fixed effects and province-specific time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at
county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
A14
Table A.6: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Lagged Dependent Variable
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mass rebellion -0.068∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.051∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
[0.002] [0.015] [0.027] [0.017]






L.Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books) 0.548∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.297 0.349 0.349 0.349
Observations 37952 37952 37952 37952
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. All regres-
sions include county and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table A.7: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Placebo Tests
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F.Mass rebellion 0.046 0.045 0.041 0.046
(0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
[0.226] [0.179] [0.235] [0.172]






County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.243 0.243 0.243
Observations 40324 40324 40324 40324
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. All regres-
sions include county and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table A.8: Mass Rebellion and Clan Activity: Elite Rebellion
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
(1) (2)
Mass rebellion -0.069∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023)
[0.003] [0.004]






County FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
Province-specific trend Yes Yes
R2 0.244 0.244
Observations 40324 40324
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Sample period is 1000-1849. All regressions
include county and period fixed effects and province-specific time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at
county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.9: Mass Rebellion and Ming Military Garrisons: Linear Dependent Variable
Dependent variable: Garrisons
(1) (2) (3)
Mass rebellion 0.228∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.068) (0.062)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Prefectural FE No Yes Yes
County-level controls No No Yes
R2 0.023 0.234 0.275
Observations 2372 2372 2365
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county. Sample period is first century of Ming Dynasty
(1368-1467). Dependent variable is number of early Ming military garrisons. Variable of interest is number
of mass rebellions over this sample period. County-level controls include latitude and longitude, distance to
coast (log), distance to major rivers (log), distance to provincial capital (log), mean elevation, mean slope, mean
agricultural suitability for rain-red rice, and mean agricultural suitability for irrigated rice. Robust standard
errors clustered at county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.10: Clan Activity Before and After Taiping Rebellion: 15-Year Window
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
[1820-34]+[1835-49] [1835-49]+[1870-84]
(1) (2)
Period*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.070
(0.108)
[0.515]
Period*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.349∗∗
(0.142)
[0.014]
County FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
R2 0.828 0.823
Observations 4744 4744
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Column 1 includes data for 1820-34 and
1835-49. Column 2 includes data for 1835-49 and 1870-84. All regressions include county and period fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.11: Clan Activity Before and After Taiping Rebellion: 25-Year Window
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Genealogy Books)
[1800-24]+[1825-49] [1825-49]+[1870-94]
(1) (2)
Period*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.171
(0.137)
[0.213]
Period*Mass rebellion (1850-69) 0.411∗∗∗
(0.155)
[0.008]
County FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
R2 0.830 0.838
Observations 4744 4744
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is county-period. Column 1 includes data for 1800-24 and
1825-49. Column 2 includes data for 1825-49 and 1870-94. All regressions include county and period fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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